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ABSTRACT 
In 1965 Congress passed the Ocean Research Vessel Act (ORVA) 
with the purpose of encouraging the nation's efforts in 
oceanographic studies. Section 4 of the ORVA states that 
11 scientific personnel on an oceanographic research vessel 
shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of title 
53 of the Revised Statutes ... 11 • As a result of a literal 
interpretation of this wording, the Courts have ruled that 
scientific personnel are excluded from the beneficial remedies 
afforded all other seamen under the Jones Act. Some courts 
have also denied an injured scientist "seaman status" under 
the general maritime law. This paper argues that Congress 
never intended to exclude scientists from the statutory 
protection of the Jones Act, and that this inequitable 
circumstance has arisen due to faulty interpretation of the 
ORVA's legislative history. Scientists on research vessels 
work in a hazardous environment. They are exposed to the 
"perils of the sea" to the same degree as all other blue water 
seamen. The paper calls for Congressional re-evaluation of 
the ORVA, with the .purpose of amending Section 4, in order to 
clarify its original meaning and ensure an injured scientist 
the same remedies afforded all seamen. 
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PREFACE 
On a sunny Wednesday afternoon in mid-June, my computer and 
printer were both humming, churning out what I hoped would 
be the final draft of this paper. I felt it was a good 
paper, perhaps very good. I had researched the Ocean 
Research Vessel Act of 1965 and all subsequent court 
decisions which referenced that law. An inequity seemed to 
exist. Compared to their shipmates, scientists aboard 
research vessels are at a considerable disadvantage with 
respect to legal remedies available in case of personal 
injury. In addition, the legislative history of the Act did 
not seem to support the judicial outcome. While the number 
of persons who were affected by this inequity was not large, 
the issue was significant for those who were so affected, 
and therefore seemed worthy of consideration. 
I put the paper into the proper format, packaged it up, and 
prepared to submit it. Only hours before I dropped the 
envelope in the mail, I learned that the United States 
Supreme Court had handed down a new decision on a "seaman's 
status" case. Interesting I thought. I was quite surprised 
that a "seaman status" case had made it up to the Supreme 
Court without my having unearthed it. But it was not an 
ORVA seaman status case. I didn't imagine that it would 
i 
significantly impact the paper which I had just completed. I 
was extremely interested in reading the decision, but that 
would have to wait. My bags were already packed and I was 
on my way to Alaska, where I was scheduled to take command 
of a small research vessel for the summer1 • 
Upon my return from sea, I anxiously called my advisor to 
inquire what his reaction to my paper had been. I was 
extremely disheartened to learn that the Court's June seaman 
status decision was a far reaching one which might have 
considerable impact on my conclusions. The paper would have 
been acceptable except for that decision handed down the 
same day that the paper was completed. He suggested I get a 
copy of the decision, study it, and then get back to him. 
I immediately logged on to the Internet, and downloaded a 
copy of the Court reporter's syllabus for the decision. It 
would be a few more days before I could get a copy of the 
full opinion. I could tell from the syllabus, however, 
that the Court had used this case as a forum to elaborate on 
the broad issue of standards a maritime worker must meet in 
order to attain that valued classification known as 
''seaman's status." The case in question was a Jones Act 
suit brought by a superintendent engineer injured while 
1The author is a licensed Master Mariner who 
specializes in research vessel operation. 
ii 
working aboard a cruise ship. 2 The vessel was not a 
research vessel, and the injured employee was not a 
scientist. The decision in this case, however, was a 
statement by the Court on the broader question of seaman 
status for all maritime workers. 
After careful consideration of the decision and the 
concurring opinion in Chandris v. Latsis, I feel that the 
arguments presented and the conclusions drawn in this work 
remain valid. The paper which follows has been re-written, 
where necessary, in order to incorporate the new 
jurisprudence on "seaman status", as elaborated by the 
Supreme Court in June. 
The decision in Chandris may well have a major impact on 
"seaman status" cases. It is likely to do so. Only time 
will tell. The Chandris decision may be a turning point in 
the Court's general direction on Jones Act "seaman status" 
cases which has been evident for over half a century, since 
the enactment of the Jones Act. The Court's decision may 
serve to limit those maritime workers eligible for such 
"status." If so, certainly some scientists will be affected 
by the Chandris decision. Under the Chandris rule alone, 
some scientists probably would fail to qualify for "seaman 
status", and thereby Jones Act applicability. But not all 
2 Chandris v. Latsis, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047, * 
iii 
will be so affected. Some oceanographic scientists and 
technicians will pass the Chandris test, and yet still be 
denied Jones Act protection due to the decisional law 
pertaining to the ORVA. 
Therefore, in the wake of the Supreme Court's Chandris 
decision, the inequity outlined in this paper still exists. 
It is likely that fewer sea-going scientists will be denied 
the valuable "seaman status" classification under the ORVA 
jurisprudence because some will already be disqualified from 
such status due to failure to meet the Chandris test. But 
for scientists who do meet the Chandris test, the inequity 
will now be even greater. The conclusions found in this 
paper still stand. An inequity exists due to judicial 




Sea-going is a dangerous enterprise. Seamen confront the 
perils of the sea -- the power and whim of wind, wave and 
tide. The missions of water-borne ventures often require 
voyages of great distance, far from safe refuge, depriving 
seamen of the facilities, support and comfort of home . 
Society has long recognized the hardships and dangers faced 
by seamen. As early as Medieval times, the ancient sea 
codes provided seamen the right of "maintenance and cure'' 
for illness and injuries sustained at sea. 1 In the United 
States the law has long afforded greater remedy for seamen 
than for land based workers. 2 
Three basic remedies are available to an injured seaman 
under present United States law. Two are maintained under 
the general maritime law: the right to "maintenance and 
cure" and the right to maintain an action against a vessel 
or shipowner for injuries caused by breach of the warranty 
of seaworthiness. 3 The third is a statutory right, 
available since 1920, to bring suit for injuries sustained, 
1Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Edition, 
Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1975 @ 281; Also see J. Sims, 
The American law of maritime personal injury and death: An 
historical review. 55 Tul. L. Rev. 973, @974- 977 (June 1981) 
2Frank 1. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 2d Edition. 
St. Paul:West Publishing Co. 1988 , p.175 
3The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) 
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against a negligent employer under the provisions of the 
Jones Act. 4 The right to maintain an action under any of 
the above doctrines depends upon the injured wo+ker's 
status, i.e. whether he or she can be classified as a 
"seaman". Therefore, a great body of litigation and case 
law has developed over the issue of "seaman status". 
In 1965 Congress enacted the Ocean Research Vessel Act 
(ORVA) 5 , intended to encourage oceanographic research by 
removing several restrictions on research vessels which 
previously had hampered the nation's expansion in the marine 
sciences. 6 Prior to the enactment of this law, research 
vessels were required to be inspected as either passenger 
vessels or cargo vessels. The operators of such vessels 
maintained that regulatory requirements for passenger and 
cargo vessels were not appropriate for the special 
construction and operation of research vessels. 7 One of 
4 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. The Jones Act is the common name for 
a section of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which established 
an employers liability to an injured seaman caused by the 
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the 
employer. 
50cean Research Vessel Act of 1965, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 441-
445 
6Senate, Commerce Committee, Exemption of oceanographic 
research vessels from certain inspection laws: Purpose of the 
bill. 89th Congress, 1st session, 1965, S.R. 168. 
7see United States House of Representatives, 
Oceanographic Research Vessel Exemption: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries. 89th Congress, 1st session, No.89-8, May 
2 
the problems faced by the research vessel operators was that 
scientific personnel had to be classified as either 
passengers or crew. Vessels were only permitted to carry a 
limited number of passengers before being required to meet 
the comprehensive safety standards for passenger carrying 
vessels, with which few research vessels could comply. 8 On 
the other hand, if considered members of the crew, 
scientists were required to apply for, and obtain, Merchant 
Mariner's documents from the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) . This was seen as an inefficient requirement which 
was both costly and time consuming. 
The method chosen by Congress to grant the relief sought by 
research vessel operators 9 was to declare that: 
Sec. 2 - "An oceanographic research vessel shall not be 
considered a passenger vessel ... "10 
and 
4,5, 1965. 
9 It is worth noting that not only was oceanographic 
research deemed to be in the public interest, but at that 
time, most research vessels operating in the United States 
were either owned or supported by the federal government. 
Even today, when there is a larger commercial research vessel 
industry, the United States government maintains operational 
and/or financial control over a fleet of over 60 vessels. 
Philip A. Sacks, "The changing environment for the federal 
research vessel fleet: Where lies the future?" Unpublished 
paper, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 1995. 
1046 U.S.C.A. § 442. Repealed 1983 by P.L. 98-89, now 
contained in 46 U.S.C.A. § 3302 
3 
Sec. 4 - " Scientific personnel on an oceanographic 
research vessel shall not be considered seamen under 
the provisions of title 53 of the Revised Statutes and 
Act[sic] amendatory thereof or supplementary 
thereto. "11 
The language in section 4 is vague, and does not clearly 
define what provisions of title 53 Congress had been 
concerned with. The Courts have taken a very broad reading 
of section 4, interpreting it literally, while holding in 
several cases that Congress intended to broadly exclude 
sc i entists from seaman status. The jurisprudence has 
produced an inequitable result which is regrettable. 
Scientists on research vessels are now excluded from the 
right to seek remedy under the statutory provisions of the 
Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act (DOSHA) , which 
have been ruled by the courts to be supplementary to title 
53. Scientists have in most courts maintained their 
remedies as seamen under the general maritime law, but in 
some courts even these protections are jeopardized. 1 2 The 
result is unfortunate on several counts . 
Scientists on ORVs are blue water seamen who face the 
"perils of the sea" to the same degree, if not greater, than 
most crew members today who are employed in the more 
1146 U.S.C.A. § 444 
12Craig v. M/V Peacock 760 F. 2d 953 
4 
"traditional" seaman's positions. Except for scientists, 
who, as a result of misinterpretation of the ambiguities 
found in section 4 of the ORVA13 have been excluded "seaman 
status" for several important remedies, the courts have 
been expanding the application of "seaman status" to include 
all other blue water sailors who in the course of their 
employment are regularly exposed to the hazards of the 
sea. 14 
Due to the fact that scientists are excluded from important 
federal protections afforded injured seamen, they are often 
forced to seek relief from state workers' compensation 
13 Instructors and students on Sailing School Vessels were 
similarly also exempted by Congress in the Sailing School 
Vessel Act of 1982, a law modeled after the ORVA, with a 
similar purpose of granting relief from passenger vessel 
regulations deemed inappropriate for vessels of a specialty 
class. 46 U.S.C.A § 446 
14 In June of this year, the Supreme Court spoke to the 
issue of "seaman status" in Chandris v. Latsis, 1995 U.S. 
LEXIS 4047, *: a Jones Act suit involving a superintendent 
engineer injured while working on a cruise ship. In its 
Chandris decision the Court seems to have reversed its general 
trend of expanding applicability of Jones Act coverage through 
seaman's status decisions which has been evident since the 
passage of the Act in 1920. However, the ruling in Chandris 
establishes only the minimum temporal connection with the 
vessel in order to distinguish a sea-going maritime worker 
from a land-based maritime employee. The Chandris decision 
does nothing to alter the Court's 1991 decision in McDermott 
International v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 112, which very clearly 
expands "seaman status" applicability to any employee doing 
the "ships work. " In fact, in Chandris the Court continues to 
hold that: "The Jones Act is reserved for sea-based maritime 
employees whose work regularly exposes them to the special 
hazards and disadvantages to which those who go down to the 
sea in ships are exposed. " (Quoting Seas Shipping Co. V. 
Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 104, 1946, Stone, C. dissenting.) 
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statutes. This serves to undermine the longstanding policy 
of maintaining uniformity and consistency within the federal 
maritime law. In addition, further inequity can result from 
the differences in applicability and relief provided by the 
compensation laws of the various states. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine this inequitable 
result. To ask why, two persons, perhaps the bosun and a 
scientist, working side by side on the aft deck of an ORV 
may, if injured, have very different remedies available to 
them, depending upon the determination of their respective 
"seaman status''? The remainder of this paper is divided 
into six sections. In the next, the three basic remedies 
available to seamen: maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, 
and the Jones Act, are discussed in more detail. The third 
section reviews the history of the jurisprudence on "seaman 
status" in general. Then follows a review of the Ocean 
Research Vessel Act, including a close examination of the 
legislative history, in an attempt to determine Congress' 
purpose in enacting the law, and whether it intended to 
seve~ely limit the remedies available to an injured 
scientist. The case law which has resulted from court 
interpretation of the "seaman status" of scientists is 
outlined in section V. An analysis and discussion follows 
in section VI, in which the paper argues that the courts 
have misinterpreted the legislative history concerning 
6 
Congressional intent in the ORVA. The paper finds only one 
reference to the Jones Act in the entire record of the 
legislative hearings on the bill, and holds that the 
reference to "seaman status" and title 53 of the Revised 
Statutes intended only to exempt scientists from the 
requirement to carry Merchant Mariners Documents, not to 
exclude scientists from coverage under the Jones Act. The 
paper finds no policy justification for the result that has 
ensued, where an individual class of blue-water workers is 
singularly denied the beneficial remedies afforded all other 
"seamen". In the concluding section, two options are 
suggested to rectify the inequity which now exists. The 
first is for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari of an 
ORVA "seaman's status" case in order to re-analyze the 
legislative history. Although it is unlikely that the Court 
will express an interest in such a narrow area of the 
maritime law, it has shown an interest in "seaman status" 
cases over the last few years, and may choose to hear a case 
in order to reconcile the differences between the Circuits 
in their ORVA decisions . It could give the Court an 
opportunity to elaborate the "seaman status" test started in 
199115 and further defined this year in the case of 
Chandris v. Latsis16 , if it feels additional elaboration is 
necessary. The second, and more likely solution suggested 
15McDermott International v. Wilander 498 U.S. 112 
16115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995) 
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is for Congress to recognize the mischief which has been 
done with ambiguities in section 4 of the ORVA, and to amend 
the law in order to clarify its original intent, and 
overrule the jurisprudence which has led to the inequity. 
II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO SEAMEN 
Maintenance and cure 
The right to maintenance and cure is the only remedy 
available to seamen which is ancient in origin. 17 It was a 
recognized right of seamen even before the American 
Revolution, when a seaman who was wounded, maimed or fell 
ill in service to the ship was entitled to maintenance and 
cure at the expense of the vessel . 18 Maintenance and cure 
in the United States is a right created under the general 
maritime law, first mentioned by Justice Story in 1823. 19 
Courts have since recognized maintenance and cure as an 
obligation of the vessel to a sick or injured seaman a 
right which could only be lost if the injury resulted from 
the seaman's willful misconduct. Even though this seaman's 
remedy was long recognized, precise definition concerning 
17Sims, supra @ 973 
18 Id. @ 978 
19Harden v. Gordon 11 F. Cas. 480 (1823), cited by T. 
Schoenbaum, supra. @ 159 
8 
the extent of the right developed through case law slowly. 
A seaman is now considered "in service to his ship" if he is 
subject to call by the vessel. 2 0 Maintenance refers to the 
seaman's right to room and board while receiving medical 
treatment. The courts have held that the seaman under 
treatment is entitled to the value of room and board he was 
receiving onboard the ship, 21 which has been held in modern 
times to be anywhere between eight and thirty dollars per 
day. 22 "Cure" is the right to necessary medical treatment, 
but the ship's duty only continues until the seaman is cured 
or has reached the point of maximum recovery. 23 The 
injured seaman is also entitled to unearned wages until the 
end of the voyage . 24 The vessel's obligation to provide 
maintenance and cure is without regard to fault. Neither 
negligence nor causation is relevant25 , therefore 
maintenance and cure have been described as a type of no-
fault health insurance. In order to be entitled to the 
right of maintenance and cure the injured worker must 
2 0 rd. @ 979, citing The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831 (Second 
Circuit 1917) 
22D. Nixon, "Recent developments in 
fishing vessel safety, insurance, and law." 
Com. 359, 364 (1986) . 
U.S. commercial 
17 J. Mar. L. 
2 3Schoenbaum, supra. , @ 161, citing Farrell v . United 
States, 336 U.S. 511 
24 Id. @ 160 
9 
qualify as a "seaman. "26 The injured worker's employer27 , 
is liable in personam for the expenses of maintenance and 
cure, and the vessel may also be liable in rem. Sick and 
injured seamen formerly received free medical care at Public 
Health Service hospitals, at U.S. government expense, until 
these facilities were closed in 1981. 28 
The Osceola 
Before the twentieth century, the American law of maritime 
personal injury and death was narrow in scope and nearly 
static. 29 In this century however, it has become a dynamic 
and complex aspect of the law, as Congress and the Courts 
have sought to create "new remedies to meet the social, 
26According to Schoenbaum: "The legal test for seaman 
status for purposes of maintenance and cure is the same as 
that established for determining status under the Jones Act." 
supra. @ 160. See however, section V infra, the test of 
"seaman status" for scientists is now different under the 
general maritime law and the Jones Act. Sennett v. Shell Oil 
Company, 325 F. Supp. 1 (D. New Orleans 1971). 
27Tradi tionally the "seaman's" employer was the shipowner. 
In recent years, however, the nature of the maritime industry, 
and the employer/ employee relationship between sea-going 
workers and the ship owner has been changing. In the offshore 
oil industry, for example, many workers may be working aboard 
a vessel for an employer other than the shipowner. The same 
is true in the oceanographic research field. Scientists 
aboard research vessels may be employees of the shipowner, but 
often are not. It is not uncommon to have groups of 
scientists with various different employers, possibly from 
several states or even foreign countries, working together on 
the same vessel. 
28Nixon, supra. @ 364. 
29Sims, supra. @ 973. 
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economic and human needs resulting from ever-expanding 
maritime operations. 1130 In 1903, the Supreme Court 
summarized seamen's remedies available under American law. 
In the landmark case of The Osceola31 , the Court held that: 
the law may be considered settled on the following 
propositions: 
1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a 
seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the 
ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to 
his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued. 
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English 
and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries 
received by a seaman in consequence of the 
unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and 
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the 
ship. 
3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps, 
the master, are, as between themselves, fellow 
servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries 
sustained through the negligence of another member of 
the crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and 
cure. 
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an 
30Id. 
31189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
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indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any 
member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and 
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence 
or accident. 32 
The Court's opinion in Osceola consolidated maintenance and 
cure jurisprudence, and clarified the long recognized duty 
of a ship owner to provide a seaworthy vessel for the crew 
by declaring the seaman's right to indemnity for injuries 
sustained as a result of unseaworthiness. Significantly, 
the Court also declared that the general maritime law 
contained no right for a seaman to maintain a negligence 
action for injuries sustained. Only the Osceola's first 
proposition, concerning the vessel's and shipowner's duty to 
provide maintenance and cure, has stood the test of time. 33 
The other three have been either abrogated or substantially 
modified by the Courts and by Congress, with the changes in 
most cases expanding not only the type of remedy available 
for the protection of an injured seaman, but also the types 
of maritime workers who could be classified as eligible to 
maintain a 11 seaman's 11 action . 34 
32 Id. @ 175. 
33Sims, supra @ 984. 
34A significant exception to this trend was Congress' 1972 
action which overruled earlier court trends which extended 
seaman's status to shorebased maritime workers who performed 
the work normally done by seamen. In amending the Longshore 
and Harborworkers Compensation Act (LHWCA), however, Congress 
12 
Unseaworthiness 
The shipowner's duty to provide a seaman with a seaworthy 
vessel is greater than the seaworthiness duty owed to 
others. A vessel seaworthy for a crewman has been defined 
as one which is "reasonably fit for [its] intended use" . 35 
Because seamen live and work on the vessel, the concept of 
"seaworthiness" means a place reasonably fit to both live 
and work. 36 The obligation of the shipowner to provide a 
seaworthy vessel is absolute. It has therefore been 
described as a warranty. However, it is not contractual but 
imposed by tort law as a consequence of the seaman's 
relationship to the vessel. 37 It is a difficult task to 
determine when a work area for a hazardous occupation is 
reasonably fit for its intended use, and the courts have not 
established a precise formula for application. 38 In its 
well cited opinion in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., the 
Supreme Court defined the ship operator's obligation in the 
following way: 
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is 
obligated to furnish an accident free ship. The duty 
extended another federal remedy to the workers who it was 
denying seaman status. 33 U.S.C. 901 et. sec. 
35Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) 
36Maraist, supra. @ 196. 
38 Id. @ 197. 
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is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel 
and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended 
use. The standard is not perfection, but reasonable 
fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable 
storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, 
but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended 
' 39 service ... 
An unseaworthy condition can be both temporary and 
transitory. 40 To establish unseaworthiness, it is not 
required that the owner had an opportunity to remedy the 
unseaworthy condition, nor that he was even aware of its 
existence. 41 It may arise after the vessel has left 
port. 42 The duty of seaworthiness is absolute and does not 
depend upon a ship owner's negligence. 4 3 Unseaworthiness 
and negligence were originally considered to be distinctly 
separate concepts, with unseaworthiness restricted to the 
structure of the ship and its appurtenances, and negligence 
arising only from error in the direction and control of 
operations aboard ship. 44 In its 1944 opinion in Mahnich 
39362 U.S. 539 (1960). 
43Schoenbaum, supra. @ 166. 
44 Sims, supra. @ 985. 
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v. Southern Steamship Company1 5 , the Supreme Court muddied 
this distinction, finding a vessel unseaworthy as a result 
of the mate's operational error in selection of a faulty 
rope. The Court's trend to broaden the concept of 
unseaworthiness continued until its apparent reversal of 
direction in 1971, finding that an "isolated personal 
negligent act "46 did not render the vessel unseaworthy . 47 
The duty of seaworthiness is owed by the vessel operator. 
Often the operator is the seaman's employer. However, in 
the changing environment of shipping and other maritime 
ventures, the seaman may be working for an employer other 
than the vessel operator. 4 8 In this case, the seaman is 
still owed the duty of seaworthiness by the operator. Under 
a demise charter, the operator becomes the owner pro hac 
vice and assumes the obligation to provide a seaworthy 
vessel. 49 
Negligence 
The third and fourth propositions of The Osceola establish a 
45321 U.S. 96 (1944). 
46Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. , 
(1971) . 
47Sims, supra. @ 986. 
48 See n. 25 supra. 
49Maraist, supra . @ 198 
15 
400 U.S. 494 
single rule. Namely, that seamen could not recover damages 
for injuries caused by negligent actions of the master or a 
fellow crew member. 50 The seaman's union was not satisfied 
with this ·limitation on compensation, and advocated for 
change. Congress first attempted to overrule the Supreme 
Court's Osceola decision, with the passage of the Merchant 
Seaman's Act of 1915, which provided in section 20, that 
seamen having command shall not be considered fellow 
servants of those under their authority. 51 Three years 
later, the Court declared that Congress has missed the mark 
with the 1915 Act, in its (Congress') belief that the 
"fellow servant" doctrine was what barred seamen's recovery 
for negligence. In Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship 
Co. 52 , the Court held that it was not the "fellow servant" 
rule contained in proposition three of Osceola, but the 
fourth proposition, denying recovery for injuries sustained 
due to the negligence of the master or a member of the crew, 
which barred the seaman's recovery. 53 
Chelentis was a fireman aboard the steamship J.L. Luckenbach 
whose leg was broken when he was knocked down by a wave. He 
received due care immediately, entered the marine hospital 
on arrival in New York, but eventually his leg required 
50Sims, supra. @ 987. 
51 38 Stat .1164, § 20. 
52 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
53 Sims, supra. @ 987. 
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amputation. The seaman filed an action asserting that the 
injury resulted from the negligence and an improvident order 
of a superior officer. In the complaint, the seaworthiness 
of the vessel was not questioned and no claim was made for 
maintenance and cure. In affirming summary judgement 
denying Chelentis a negligence action, the Supreme Court 
mooted Congress' 1915 efforts, holding: 
The language of the section disclose no intention to 
impose upon shipowners the same measure of liability 
for injuries suffered by the crew while at sea as the 
common law prescribes for employers in respect of their 
employees ashore. s4 
Congress quickly responded to the Court's challenge, passing 
the Jones Act in 1920, which established the right to 
recover damages for injury to, or death of, a seaman arising 
from the negligence of the owner, master, or fellow crew 
member.ss The method chosen by Congress to grant a remedy 
to seamen for injury caused by negligence was to extend the 
applicability of the Federal Employer's Liability Acts 6 
(FELA). The law established the seaman's right to trial by 
jury and eliminated contributory negligence as a defense. 57 
54Id. 
s546 u.s.c. @ 688 
56 45 U.S.C. @ 51 et. seq. 
57Sims, supra., @ 988 
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The defendant in a Jones Act suit is the seaman's employer, 
which may or may not be the vessel owner. 58 The Jones Act 
gives the seaman the option to bring suit in federal 
admiralty jurisdiction or to file his claim at law with 
right to a jury trial in either state or federal court. 
Actions filed in state court are not removable. 
The Jones Act was used as the principal tool for asserting 
seaman's personal injury and death claims from the time of 
its passage until 1950. Since then, unseaworthiness claims 
have gained in importance because of the more liberal 
interpretation of the concept of seaworthiness, with the 
Jones Act being used to obtain trial by jury. 59 
Wrongful death 
Historically, under common law and the English Admiralty 
doctrine, no duty was owed the survivors of a deceased 
seaman other than the payment of wages and the return of his 
effects. 60 In 1886, the Supreme Court ruled that: 
... it is now established that in the courts of the 
United States no action can be maintained for [a 
wrongful death] in the absence of a statute giving the 
right ... [and] we are forced to the conclusion that no 
58 See supra note 25. 
s9Id. 
60Sims, supra@ 1004. 
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such action will lie in the courts of the United States 
under the general maritime law. 61 
Congress and the Court allowed state wrongful death statutes 
to fill the void created by the lack of a federal remedy 
until 1920 when Congress granted wrongful death and 
survivors actions to survivors of seamen62 , with the Jones 
Act provision which extended FELA applicability to seaman. 
In the same year, Congress passed the Death on the High Seas 
Act 63 (DOHSA) , which provides a cause of action for the 
death of any person caused by wrongful act, neglect, or 
default more than three miles from shore. 64 A deceased 
seaman's survivors may seek remedy under both the Jones Act 
and DOSHA. The Supreme Court addressed a number of 
anomalies in the remedies available for wrongful death at 
sea with its 1970 Moragne65 opinion which overruled The 
Harrisburg6 6 , finding a wrongful death action within the 
general maritime law. 
The current U.S. law concerning wrongful death at sea is 
generally regarded as a strange and confusing array of 
61The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
62Maraist, supra@ 279. 
63 46 u.s.c. §§ 761-768. 
64 Schoenbaum, supra @ 237. 
65Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375. 
66 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
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remedies, depending upon a complex interplay of a decedent's 
"status", the "situs", or location of death, and the 
instrumentality involved --vessel, platform, or aircraft. 67 
A seaman's survivors now may maintain an action for wrongful 
death under several federal statutes, under the general 
maritime law, and in some instances under state wrongful 
death statutes. 
Interaction between remedies in seamen's injury cases 
There is considerable overlap between the damages awardable 
under the doctrines of maintenance and cure, 
unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act. Double damages are not 
allowed, and any awards received under a claim for one of 
the above stated remedies will reduce an award for the same 
injury granted under another. Double damages are not a 
problem, because unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence 
claims arising out of the same injury must be joined. 6 8 
Because an unseaworthiness action arises out of the general 
maritime law, and the Jones Act claim does not, some 
elements of damages may be recoverable under one but not the 
other. 6 9 Punitive damages are not available under the 
Jones Act, but may be awarded in an unseaworthiness 
67Sims, supra @ 1008. 
6 8Maraist, supra @ 2 05. 
69Id. 
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claim7 0 • Loss of society (consortium) can also be awarded 
under the general maritime law but is not available under 
the statutory provisions of the Jones Act. 71 Damages 
recoverable under both the Jones Act and the general 
maritime law of unseaworthiness include: 
1 . Pre-judgement loss of wages sustained by the injured 
party; 
2. loss of future wage earning capacity; 
3. past and future costs of medical care and any other 
economic loss incurred; 
4. physical pain and suffering; and 
5. mental anguish and anxiety. 72 
With the expansion of the applicability of the doctrine of 
unseaworthiness since 1950, much of the distinction between 
a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness action have been 
erased. Nevertheless, practitioners will always file a 
Jones Act claim whenever it is remotely available because it 
establishes the right to trial by jury, and maintenance and 
cure and unseaworthiness cases can be joined and also heard 
by the jury. It is well accepted that a jury is more likely 
to award greater damages to an injured worker than a 
?old. 
71Schoenbaum, supra @ 187 
72 Id. @ 186. 
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judge. 7 3 Additionally, the Jones Act claim remains 
important to an injured seaman, because it is still possible 
for a worker to be injured on a vessel found to be 
seaworthy74 , in which case a negligence claim against the 
employer may be the only remedy available in addition to 
perhaps meager damages awarded under maintenance and cure. 
Workmen's compensation 
Remedies available to injured land-based workers are 
generally found within the workmen's compensation system of 
the state in which the injured worker is employed. In 
workmen's compensation systems employers accept a type of 
strict liability for all injuries sustained by workers in 
their employ. In exchange for acceptance of this "no-fault" 
arrangement, the amount of damages awarded are limited and 
fixed by law, thereby protecting the employer from unlimited 
liability for a worker's injuries. Each state has its own 
workmen's compensation system with its own governing laws 
and award levels. 
Workmen's compensation is generally deemed to be mutually 
exclusive from damages awarded to an injured seaman under 
73Nixon, supra @ 367. 
7 4Usner v . Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U. S. 494 (1971). 
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the Jones Act. 75 In 1917, in the landmark decision of 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 76 the Supreme Court ruled 
that a state could not constitutionally apply its workers' 
compensation system to a worker injured on a vessel upon 
navigable waters. The Court concluded that in the interest 
of uniformity of the nation's maritime law, state laws 
concerning workers' injuries could not be effective on 
navigable waters. A "twilight zone" was thereby created, 
which included persons injured while working on vessels, but 
who could not be considered seamen. In order to rectify the 
situation, where certain workers could find themselves 
without remedy in case of injury, Congress first attempted 
to extend applicability of state workmen's compensation laws 
to non-seamen injured on navigable waters. This too was 
struck down by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional 
delegation of the federal legislative power. 77 The Court 
did permit the application of state workmen's compensation 
statutes in certain instances if injuries sustained by a 
worker on navigable waters were deemed to be "maritime but 
local " 78 • In 1926 the Court ruled that a maritime worker 
75See Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Education, 
636 A.2d 1313 (R.I. 1994); and Decourt v. Beckman Instruments, 
Inc., 32 Cal. App.3d 628 (C.A. Cal. 4th Appellate Dist., Div. 
11973). 
76 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
77Maraist, supra @ 223. 
78 Id. citing Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 
U.S. 469 (1922). 
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performing work aboard a vessel normally done by a member of 
the crew could be considered a Jones Act seaman. 79 
Congress reacted to this by passing the Longshoremen's and 
Harborworkers Compensation Act 80 (LHWCA) in 1927, which 
created a federal workers' compensation system for landbased 
maritime workers injured upon navigable waters, and for the 
most part eliminated the "twilight zone" of overlapping 
and/or vanishing remedies for certain classes of injured 
workers. The LHWCA has since been amended to extend 
coverage inland of the waters edge and to specifically 
include additional maritime workers, further defining the 
line between maritime workers who should receive awards for 
injuries under a no-fault workmen's compensation type 
system, and seamen, who because of the hazards faced by 
their exposure to the perils of the sea, are awarded the 
more generous beneficial remedies of the Jones Act and the 
general maritime law. 
III. "SEAMAN STATUS" - THE RIGHT TO SEAMEN'S REMEDIES 
"In recognition of their exposure to the physical and 
psychological hazards of their distinctly maritime high risk 
79 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 
(1926). 
80 3 3 u. S. C. A. § § 9O1 et seq. 
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environment, seamen are afforded special protections under 
the United States maritime law. " 81 The right to maintain a 
claim under any of the special protections outlined in the 
previous section82 depends upon determination that an 
injured worker is a seaman. 83 As a result, most 
litigation over damages awarded for injury or death to a 
maritime worker have involved the question of "seaman 
status". A huge body of case law exists on the subject. 
The courts have been involved with the issue for the last 
sixty years, struggling to establish and apply sensible 
criteria for determining "seaman status. 11 8 4 
The Supreme Court broke its silence on the issue of "seaman 
81D. 
status . 
Robertson, A new approach to 
64 Texas L. Rev. 79,80 (1985). 
determining seaman 
82Except DOSHA which provides an action for wrongful death 
by any person, not just seamen. However, courts have 
interpreted sect i on 4 of the ORVA as precluding scientists 
from seamen status for DOSHA application , which prevents a 
decedent scientist's "personal representative" from asserting 
an unseaworthiness claim under DOSHA, an action available to 
the survivors of seamen. see Schoenbaum, supra@ 237, note 9. 
83An action under DOHSA is available to all persons, not 
only seamen. Some courts have extended interpretation of 
section 4 of the ORVA to exclude a scientist from "seaman 
status" under DOHSA as well as the Jones Act. In cases such 
as this however, the decedent scientists survivors should 
still be able to maintain a non-seaman's wrongful death action 
under DOSHA. 
84Robertson, supra @ 83. 
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status" in 199185 , after having allowed the Circuits to 
create the law in this area for over three decades. 8 6 Even 
after the Court's decision in McDermott International v. 
Wilander, we were far from having a bright line rule 
available for guidance with respect to seaman status. In 
Wilander, the Court did little to provide policy guidance to 
clarify the complex and confusing body of law pertaining to 
remedies for seamen's injuries. The Court responded again 
earlier this year. In its decision in the case of Chandris 
v. Latsis87 , the Court attempts to set a policy 
justification for the Jones Act and the determination of 
seaman status. How well the Chandris decision clarifies the 
ambiguities and simplifies the determination of "seaman 
status" in practice will only be seen over time. 
The problem with respect to the "seaman status" of 
scientists aboard research vessels is but a small part of 
this much larger issue concerning the public policy inherent 
in the existence of generous beneficial remedies for those 
85McDermott International v. Wilander 498 U. S. 112 (1991); 
Bach v. Trident Steamship Co . 920 F. 2d 322 (Fifth Circuit 
1991), cert. granted and judgement vacated; Southwest Marine, 
Inc. v. Gizoni 112 S.Ct. 486. 
86The courts last hearing of a "seaman's status" case 
previous to Wilander was in its Butler v. Whitemen opinion re-
affirming that determination of "seaman status" in a Jones Act 
suit is a question for the jury . 356 U.S. 271 (1958). 
87 115 S. Ct. 21 72 
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workers who regularly face the perils of the sea, and the 
determination of the proper extent of applicability of those 
regulations through the definition of the term "seaman". 
Even the Chandris Court, in its attempt to define the policy 
justification behind the Jones Act, still speaks favorably 
of this justification for sea-based maritime employees whose 
work regularly exposes them to the special hazards of the 
sea. 88 
Early seaman status decisions 
The earliest Admiralty law concept restricted seamen's 
remedies to those who could "hand, reef, and steer. " 89 The 
narrowest rule was that a seaman must actually navigate, but 
throughout the nineteenth century, the "federal courts 
consistently awarded seamen's benefits to those whose work 
on board ship did not direct the vessel. Firemen, 
engineers, carpenters and cooks were all considered 
seamen. 1190 As early as 1832 a cooper on a whaling vessel 
was held to be a seaman. 91 In United States v. Thompson, 
Justice Story, sitting on circuit, held that "[a] cook and 
88 1995 u. s. LEXIS 4047 I @*43 
89Fugleberg, infra citing The Canton 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (D. 
Mass. 1858). 
90McDermott International v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 112 
(1991). 
91 28 F. Cas. 102 




(CCD Mass.), cited in 
steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law, 
although they have peculiar duties assigned them. So a 
pilot, a surgeon, a ship carpenter, and a boatswain are 
deemed seamen, entitled to sue in the admiralty. 1192 By 
1850, the noted scholar Benedict wrote in The American 
Admiralty: 
... all the persons who have been necessarily or 
properly employed in a vessel as co-laborers to the 
great purpose of the voyage, have, by the law, been 
clothed with the legal rights of mariners -- no matter 
what might be their sex, character, station or 
profession. 93 
In 1882 a requirement that an injured worker have aided in 
navigation was explicitly rejected by Judge Learned Hand in 
awarding seamen's benefits to a bartender. 94 
Seaman status and the Jones Act 
The Jones Act creates a cause of action in favor of 
"any seaman" who suffers personal injury or death in 
the course of his employment. The benefits of the Act, 
however, are available only to a "seaman". Thus, to be 
admitted into the charmed circle of seamen is of 
93E. Benedict, The American Admiralty, Sec. 241, pp.133-
34. cited in Wilander, 498 U.S. 112 (1991). 
94The Minna, 11 Fed. 759, 760 (E.D. Mich . 1882), cited in 
Wilander, id. 
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special importance to the plaintiff . 95 
Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a definition of the 
term, and at the time of its enactment, neither had the 
courts provided any clear definition. 96 Early Court 
rulings after passage of the Jones Act used a very expansive 
definition of the term "seaman. " 97 In International 
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty98 the Court set the early 
pattern, upholding Jones Act coverage for a longshoreman 
injured while working during unloading operations aboard a 
vessel located upon navigable waters. 
In 1927, in response to earlier Court rulings that 
application of state worker's compensation statutes on 
navigable waters violated constitutional requirements for a 
uniform federal maritime law, Congress enacted the Longshore 
and Harborworkers Compensation Act (LHWCA) . 99 This law 
established a federal worker's compensation system for 
maritime workers, specifically excluding the ''master or 
member of a crew of any vessel" . 100 The question then 
95Schoenbaum, supra @ 1 73. 
96Robertson, supra@ 85. 
97Id. 
98 272 U.S. 50 (1926) 
99 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. 
lOOid • 
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arose if the federal compensation systems provided by the 
Jones Act and the LHWCA were mutually exclusive . 101 Early 
Court holdings on the issue proved equivocal 102 , but the 
issue was resolved with the opinion in Swanson v. Marra 
Brothers103 , holding that Congress intended the Jones Act 
and the LHWCA systems to be mutually exclusive . 104 The 
Jones Act term "any seaman" and the LHWCA term "master or 
member of the crew of any vessel" are now deemed to be 
synonymous. 105 In fact, the courts have recently begun 
using the LHWCA term for determination of seaman status in 
Jones Act suits, prompting some commentators to reflect on 
the irony, of a term used in one law receiving its 
definition in another . 106 In Wilander the Supreme Court 
concluded that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually 
exclusive and the "key requirement for Jones Act coverage 
now appears in another statute." 
1 0 1Robertson, supra @ 86. 
1 02see Robertson, supra, note 37, citing Norton v. Warner 
Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. 
Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 
(1934); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S. 128 
(1930). 
103 328 U.S. 1 (1946). 
104Robertson, supra @ 86. 
1 06 N. Fugleberg, McDermott International v. Wilander: 
Seaman status revisited. 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 1017,1032. 
30 
The Supreme Court's decisions in the middle part of this 
century provide only general guidance as to who qualifies as 
a member of a vessel's crew. 107 In South Chicago Coal & 
Dock Co. v. Bassett108 the Court sustained LHWCA coverage, 
thereby denying Jones Act "seaman status", for a barge 
worker whose main duties involved facilitating the flow of 
coal from a lighter, and who did not participate in the 
navigation of the vessel. 109 The court also found that 
determination of seaman's status is ordinarily a question of 
fact. 110 In Norton v. Warner Co. 111 , distinguishing the 
injured worker from Basset, the Court held that seaman 
status and remedy in admiralty existed for a worker who 
performed maintenance on a barge. In Norton the Court 
recognized it as important that the worker "had the 
permanent attachment to the vessel which commonly 
characterizes crew." 112 The Court denied seaman status in 
Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co. 113 to a worker who was 
injured while doing maintenance on a vessel laid up for the 
season, despite the fact that he was a member of the 
107Robert son, supra, @ 8 6 . 
108 309 U.S. 251 (1940). 
109Robertson, supra @ 86. 
110Robertson, supra@ 87. 
111327 U.S. 565 (1944). 
112Id. 
113 342 U.S. 187 (1952). 
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operational crew when the vessel was in service, concluding 
that one aspect of the test for seaman's status required the 
vessel to be in navigation. In Senko v. Lacrosse Dredging 
Corp. 114 the Court heard the case of an injured worker who, 
as a handyman on a dredge anchored in navigable waters, 
slept home at night and had never been aboard when the 
dredge had been moved. In finding the plaintiff a Jones Act 
seaman, the Senko decision clearly negates any requirement 
that a seaman be aboard the vessel primarily in aid of 
navigation. 115 The Court also re-established that the 
status issue is to be decided by a jury except in the 
clearest of cases. 116 
In these, and several per curiam decisions handed down in 
the 1950s117 , the Court failed to provide clear direction 
on the question of status, preferring to offer only general 
guidance on the issue. 118 Robertson, in a 1985 article 
entitled "A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status" 
writes that the Court had been criticized for its failure to 
114 3 5 2 u . s . 3 7 0 ( 19 5 2 ) . 
115Robertson, supra @ 90. 
117Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), rev'd 
per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Grimes v. Raymond Concrete 
Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958) (per curiam) Butler v. 
Whitemen356 U.S. 271 (1958) (per curiam). 
118Robertson, supra @ 92. 
32 
discuss the policies supporting special protections for 
seamen. 119 Robertson, however, found a policy perception 
clearly at work, and summarized it in the following way: 
. . . the two policies at work in the seaman status cases 
are, first the protection of the benevolent seamen's 
remedies to those who confront the characteristic 
seamen's hazards and, second, confining other maritime 
and amphibious workers to alternative remedial 
systems. 12 0 121 
The Fifth Circuit Offshore v.Robison 
In 1959, the Fifth Circuit attempted to consolidate seaman 
status jurisprudence. In Offshore v. Robison122 seaman 
status was upheld for a roustabout assigned to a jack-up rig 
who was injured at a time when the platform was immobile. 
In dicta, Judge Wisdom's opinion pointed to the need to 
protect workers who are exposed to the characteristic 
seamen's dangers as a central policy reference. 1 23 The 
Robison test for seaman status relies on a two prong consideration: 
121see section VI infra. It is the contention of this 
paper that the above policy goals are generally at work in the 
11 seaman status 11 jurisprudence, but that both have been ignored 
in fashioning the law concerning remedies available to 
scientists on research vessels. 
1 22 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) 
123Robertson, supra @ 95. 
33 
[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to 
go to the jury : (1) if there is evidence that the 
injured workman was assigned permanently to a vessel 
(including special purpose structures not usually 
employed as a means of transport by water but designed 
to float on water) or performed a substantial part of 
his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in 
which he was employed or the duties which he performed 
contributed to the function of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or 
welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance 
during its movement or during anchorage for its future 
trips. 124 
It is clear that under the Robison test, scientists on 
research vessels have the necessary connection to a vessel, 
and perform duties which contribute to the accomplishment of 
the vessel's mission. Therefore, except for the statutory 
exclusion that has been interpreted as contained within the 
ORVA, scientists would be afforded the same beneficial 
remedies as their "crew member" shipmates. 
The Fifth Circuit hears most seamen status cases, and the 
Robison formula has been widely adopted by the other 
circuits, although not unanimously so. The Seventh Circuit 
held in 1984, in Johnson v. John F. Beasely Construction 
1240ffshore v. Robison, supra @ 779. 
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Co., that an injured worker's duties must make a 
"significant contribution to the maintenance, operation or 
welfare to the transportation function of the vessel. " 125 
The Fifth Circuit, however, continued to construct its more 
expansive policy on seaman status in several subsequent 
cases. In 1984, the same year in which the Seventh Circuit 
decided the Johnson case, the Fifth handed down its decision 
in Wallace v. Oceaneering International, rejecting the 
narrower Johnson approach while upholding a Robison type 
analysis. In affirming judgement on a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, a diver seriously hurt during a deep water dive, 
the court stated that: 
[I]n ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has 
focused on (1) the degree of exposure to the hazards or 
perils of the sea, and (2) the maritime or terra firma 
nature of the workers duties. 
[and] 
[T]he seaman status of Wallace is established by his 
exposure to maritime perils with regularity and 
continuity, and the maritime nature of his primary 
duties. 126 
Two years later, in its Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 127 
125Johnson v. John F. Beasely Construction Co., 742 F. 2d 
1054 (7th Cir. 1984). 
126 727 F.2d 427,434 (5th Cir. 1984). 
127 752 F.2d 129, rev'd on rehearing (5th Cir. 1986) (en 
bane) 
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decision, the Fifth Circuit again reaffirmed its support of 
the Robison doctrine. A strong majority, in an en bane 
decision showed firm commitment to Robison. 
The Supreme Court re-evaluates seaman status 
In 1991 the Supreme Court decided to end its thirty-three 
year silence on the issue, agreeing to hear three seaman 
status cases. The Court accepted certiorari to resolve the 
difference between the circuits, and announced in its 
decision in McDermott International v. Wilander1 28 that the 
Fifth Circuit's Robison test would hold over the Seventh's 
Beasely formula. It can be seen then that the Court, after 
years of allowing the circuits to establish policy on the 
seaman status issue, , has decided that the more expansive 
Robison type approach -- with an inherent policy reacting 
favorably to workers who face the perils of the sea 
should now be the law of the land. After extending seaman 
status and the concomitant beneficial remedies to workers 
who face the perils of the sea, the second part of the 
policy theme has been to restrict other maritime and 
amphibious workers to alternative remedies. Both of the 
above policy forces helped to shape the Wilander 
decision. 129 
12 8 4 9 8 u. s . 112 ( 19 91 ) . 
129J. Kavanaugh, Jr. and D. Plunkett, Recent develooment: 
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander: Robison revisited -
-The "aid-in-navigation" test walks the plank. 65 Tul.L. Rev. 
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The Wilander decision firmly established that a maritime 
worker did not have to be involved in the navigation of the 
vessel to be considered a seaman. Doing the ship's work is 
enough to qualify the worker for "seaman status". The 
Wilander court spoke only to the nature of the maritime 
worker's duties, the second prong of the "seaman status" 
test established by the Robison court. 
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court used the Jones Act suit 
of Antonios Latsis against his employer Chandris, Inc. to 
speak to the first prong of the Robison test. While the 
second prong pertains to the nature of the work performed, 
the first prong of Robison deals with the required temporal 
connection with the vessel (or fleet of vessels) . In 
Chandris, the Court found that the various temporal 
requirements used to establish "seaman status" by the 
circuits varied little. 13 0 The Court saw no substantive 
difference between the traditional test which required a 
"more or less permanent connection" with the vessel and the 
Robison formulation which requires a "substantial" portion 
of the employee's work be carried out aboard the vessel. 13 1 
Within its analysis the Court discerned "the essential 
1747 I 52 (1991) • 
1301995 U.S. LEXIS 4047 @ *39. 
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contours of the 'employment-related connection to a vessel 
in navigation. ' " 132 It held that 
" a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in 
navigation (or to an identifiable group of such 
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its 
duration and its nature. The fundamental purpose of 
this substantial connection requirement is to give full 
effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and 
to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are 
entitled to Jones Act protection those land-based 
workers who have only a transitory or sporadic 
connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore 
whose employment does not regularly expose them to the 
perils of the sea. "133 
The Court went even further in actually establishing a 
quantitative guideline for the percentage of an employee's 
working time which should be aboard ship to qualify him for 
"seaman status." It relied heavily on the history of 
11 seaman status" determinations of the Fifth Circuit, noting 
with approval that the appeals court " ... has declined to 
find seaman status where the employee spends less than 30 
percent of his time aboard ship. 11134 
132 id. quoting McDermott International v. Wilander 498 
U.S. @355. 
133 id. @ *40 
134 id. @ *38. 
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Therefore, as of the Chandris decision, the court has 
created a two pronged test for "seaman status." To qualify, 
a maritime employee's duties must "contribute to the 
function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission" 
and the "seaman must have a connection to a vessel (or an 
identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in 
both its duration and its nature. 11135 
The Sieracki Seaman 
In another line of cases, dating to its 1946 decision in the 
case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki 136 , the Supreme Court 
extended seaman's status to longshoremen exerting 
unseaworthiness actions against the shipowner for injury 
incurred aboard a vessel in navigable waters. In his 
dissent to the majority opinion in Sieracki, Justice Stone 
wrote that it was exposure to the "perils of the sea" and 
the risks attending the movement of vessels on navigable 
waters which distinguish a seaman's work. 137 Congress 
overruled Sieracki, with an amendment to the LHWCA which 
excluded maritime workers covered under the Act from 
asserting a seaman's unseaworthiness action against a 
shipowner, while at the same time broadening protection 
135 id. @ *40 
136 328 U.S. 85 ( 1946) ; rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 878 
(1946) . 
137 Id., cited by Robinson, supra @ 80. 
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provided by the Act to injuries occurring on piers, docks, 
and other inland harbor areas. Here, in Congress' workings, 
its policy can be discerned: A policy which includes 
seaman's remedies for those who perform a substantial 
portion of their work aboard vessels, and who are regularly 
exposed to the perils of the sea, but denies them to others. 
Congress did not deem harborworkers so exposed, and thus the 
1972 amendments. However, Congress did not take away the 
Sieracki seaman's unseaworthiness remedy without providing 
an alternate remedy, i.e. extending the application of the 
LHWCA to a more inclusive group of maritime workers over a 
more expansive qualifying 11 situs 11 • 138 The dual policy is 
clear: Seamen's remedies for those who face the perils of 
the sea, and an alternate remedy for other maritime workers. 
It will be shown in the following sections, therefore, that 
it is illogical to interpret the ambiguous wording of 
section 4 of the ORVA as having intended to repudiate both 
of these policies as far as scientists are concerned; i.e. 
remove protection from blue water sailors exposed to the 
perils of the sea, while offering no alternative remedy. 
It has been shown in this section that seaman status 
determines access to the remedies provided by both the Jones 
Act and maintenance and cure, and in most cases the duty of 
13 8Sims, supra @ 9 94. 
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the warranty of seaworthiness. 139 According to Schoenbaum: 
The warranty of seaworthiness is a powerful doctrine, 
but it is a duty owed to a narrow class of maritime 
workers -- those who can claim "seaman" status under 
the law. Other persons who come aboard a vessel, such 
as passengers, visitors, and even scientists who serve 
on an oceanographic research vessel (emphasis added) , 
are not seamen and cannot claim the benefit of the 
warranty. 140 
The next section of the paper reviews the Ocean Research 
Vessel Act of 1972 (ORVA), and the pertinent legislative 
history, in order to determine on what policy consideration 
Congress might have based its actions in the passage of the 
Act -- provisions of which have been construed by the courts 
as intended to limit the application of seamen's status 
within a legal environment that has generally been extending 
such status to most similar maritime workers. In fact, the 
current state of the law, while still without a bright line 
test for seaman status, has clarified the distinction of 
remedies available to harborworkers and seamen. Although 
some difficulties still arise concerning the status of 
inshore maritime workers (brown water seamen) , for blue 
139Schoenbaum, supra @ 1 73. 
140 Id.@ 170., citing Craig v. M/V Peacock, 760 F.2d 953 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
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water sailors, those who are regularly exposed to the perils 
of the sea, the issue seems well settled. Blue water 
employees falling within the Robison/ Wilander/Chandris 
decisions are seamen. Except, that is, for scientists on 
research vessels, 141 who are excluded from many of the 
protections the availability of seaman's status provides. 
IV. THE OCEAN RESEARCH VESSEL ACT OF 1965 
The Problem 
In 1965 Congress passed the Ocean Research Vessel Act (ORVA) 
with the purpose of promoting oceanographic studies. 142 
Previous to the passage of the ORVA, research vessels were 
required to be inspected either as passenger or 
miscellaneous cargo vessels. The regulations likewise 
offered only two possible classifications for scientists. 
They could be considered either passengers or members of the 
crew. If more than a small number of scientists were listed 
as passengers, then the vessel had no alternative than to be 
designated as a passenger vessel, and thereby be required to 
141Also excepting instructors on Sailing School Vessels, 
who, as scientists on ORVs, are precluded from the remedies 
according to provisions in the SSVA, a law modeled in several 
important ways after the ORVA. 
142see generally Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Oceanography, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 
88th Congress, 1st session, Serial No. 89-8, May 4,5 1965. 
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meet the stringent and comprehensive construction and 
operational standards which apply to passenger carrying 
vessels. Most research vessels at that time were 
conversions of cargo and work vessels which could not 
easily, if at all, comply with passenger vessel standards. 
In addition, it was felt by the research vessel operators 
that construction and operational standards for either 
passenger or cargo vessels were not appropriate for the 
working mission of research vessels, and even when 
compliance was feasible, it was at some compromise to the 
scientific mission. 
The U.S. Coast Guard, the federal agency responsible for 
vessel inspection and operational safety, was sympathetic 
with the problems confronting the research vessel operators, 
and interpreted regulations as flexibly as the law allowed. 
Scientists were permitted by the Coast Guard to be signed 
onto the vessel's roster as members of the crew. This 
required, however, that each scientist apply for and receive 
a Merchant Mariner's document, an identification and rating 
card carried by all seamen. The manning regulations only 
allowed approximately one third of the seamen to be unrated 
''ordinary seamen" . Therefore, if too many scientists were 
signed onto the ship's roster as members of the crew, some 
could be required to obtain an "able seaman's" rating a 
process which required first establishing qualification 
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through extensive sea service, and then demonstrating 
proficiency through examination. These were seen as onerous 
and unnecessary requirements. The research vessel operators 
considered it time consuming and costly. 143 Scientists 
might be forced to travel long distances in order to find a 
Coast Guard licensing off ice authorized to issue the 
documents. 
In 1962 a group of research vessel operators, mostly from 
university and non-profit research institutions, organized 
an industry group known as the Research Vessel Operators 
Council (RVOC) . This group decided to approach Congress 
with the hope of finding relief from the regulatory corner 
they found themselves in. It should be noted that almost 
all of the funding for the vessels operated by the members 
of the RVOC came from federal sources, primarily the Navy 
and the National Science Foundation (NSF) . Therefore it is 
not surprising that these, and all other agencies involved 
in marine studies were completely supportive of some measure 
of relief. The Coast Guard supported a change in the 
shipping laws which would allow it to treat research vessels 
more favorably. In addition, during the 1960s the nation's 
interest in the oceans was growing. Funding for 
oceanographic studies was expanding rapidly. The cold war 
143 Id. @ 49 . Position paper prepared by the RVOC, 
submitted into testimony. 
44 
was at its peak, and it was deemed a national priority to 
maintain a leadership position concerning knowledge about 
the oceans . 144 This could be accomplished only with a 
concerted program in oceanographic research, which, 
according to many of those involved, was severely hampered 
by the inappropriate classification, manning, and inspection 
regulations being applied to research vessels. The stage 
was well set for a receptive ear in Congress to the research 
vessel operators' concerns. 
The legislative history 
The problem faced by research vessel operators had been 
under study by the concerned federal agencies since 
1962. 145 The Research Vessel Operators Council submitted a 
proposed bill for consideration by both Houses of the 88th 
Congress. S. 2552 was reported favorably by the Senate 
Commerce Committee146 but died when the House failed to 
take action on it. It was re-introduced in the 89th 
Congress as S.627~7 in the Senate and H.R.3419 and 
144 Id. @ 10. See statement of Hon. Hastings Keith, Rep. 
from Mass. 
145Hearings, supra @ 1. 
146U. s. Senate, Exemption of oceanographic vessels from 
vessel inspection laws. Report No .1276, 88th Congress, 2d 
Session, July 31, 1964. 
147U. s. Senate, Exemption of oceanographic research 
vessels from certain inspection laws. Report No. 168, 89th 
Congress, 1st session, April 28 1965. 
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H.R.7320 in the House. 148 Hearings were held by the 
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee (SOHMMFC) on May 4 & 5, 1965. The 
bill passed the floor of the House on July 12, 1965, the 
floor of the Senate one week later, and was enacted as the 
Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965149 • 
The purpose of the Act was: 
... to encourage and facilitate oceanographic research 
and to remove several restrictions which have hampered 
the expansion of research in the marine sciences. This 
will be accomplished by exempting oceanographic 
research vessels from the application of certain vessel 
inspection laws. 150 
The bill was presented as a remedial action in the public 
interest. 151 The goal was to get more scientists to sea. 
In the original draft, the applicability was to be only for 
RVs operated by non-profit or educational institutions, or 
state or local governments. In the 88th Congress the bill 
was amended, broadening its application to all vessels 
operated "in the public interest." Still, even this phrase 
148U. S. House of Representatives, Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee, Report No. 599, July 7, 1965. 
149Public Law 89-99: 46 U.S.C. §441-445. 
150Senate Report No. 89-168. 
151Hearings, supra @66. 
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generated considerable debate, particularly from a 
contingent of private research vessel operators because the 
Coast Guard testified that it interpreted the term "in the 
public interest "to exclude certain commercial research 
operations . 152 In the end, the bill was amended again, 
treating all research vessels employed "exclusively in 
instruction in oceanography or limnology or both, or 
exclusively in oceanographic research ... " 153 -- whether 
commercial or non-profit -- equally. 
The law as enacted is less than one page long, and contains 
five sections. The full text of the Act reads as follows: 
(1) the term "oceanographic research vessel " 
means a vessel which the Secretary of the department in 
which the Coast Guard is operating finds is being 
employed exclusively in instruction in oceanography or 
limnology, or both, or exclusively in oceanographic 
research, including, but not limited to, such studies 
pertaining to the sea as seismic, gravity meter and 
magnetic exploration and other marine geophysical or 
geological surveys, atmospheric research, and 
biological research; 




who are aboard a vessel solely for the purpose of 
engaging in scientific research, instructing, or 
receiving instruction, in oceanography or limnology. 
Sec. 2. An oceanographic research vessel shall not 
be considered a passenger vessel, a vessel carrying 
passengers, or a passenger-carrying vessel under the 
provisions of the laws relating to the inspection and 
manning of merchant vessels by reason of the carriage 
of scientific personnel. 
Sec. 3. An oceanographic research vessel shall not 
be deemed to be engaged in trade or commerce. 
Sec. 4. Scientific personnel on an oceanographic 
research vessel shall not be considered seamen under 
the provisions of title 53 of the Revised Statutes and 
Act amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto. 
Sec 5. If the Secretary of the department in 
which the Coast Guard is operating determines that the 
application to any oceanographic research vessel of any 
provision of title 52 or 53 of the Revised Statutes, or 
Acts amendatory thereto, is not necessary in the 
performance of the mission of the vessel, he may .by 
regulation exempt such vessel from such provision, upon 
such terms and conditions as he may specify. 154 
Congress thereby granted the following relief to the 
154 Public Law 89-98, July 30, 1965; 79 Stat. 424. 
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operators of research vessels: RVs would not be deemed to 
be passenger vessels and the scientists would therefore not 
be passengers. Sec. 5 authorizes the Coast Guard to exempt 
research vessels from any shipping regulations which it 
deems unnecessary. Section 4 declares that scientific 
personnel will not be considered seamen under title 53. It 
is unclear what Congress really intended to accomplish with 
the wording in section 4 . It is ambiguous. The Courts have 
found in Section 4 that it was Congress' intent to exclude 
scientific personnel from the protection of the Jones Act. 
A close reading of the legislative history does not support 
such a conclusion. 155 The hearing held by the OSHMMFC 
spanned two days, and in print, covers some 71 pages. There 
is only one reference to the Jones Act in the entire 
hearings, made by D.W . Pritchard, in which he mistakenly 
attributes the requirement to provide medical care to sick 
and injured seamen to the Jones Act, as opposed to the 
doctrine of maintenance and cure. 156 Nowhere in the 
testimony, has reference been found, to any intent to 
exclude scientists from seaman status for Jones Act 
protection. On the other hand, however, there is ample 
155See Judge Gibson's analysis of the legislative history 
of the ORVA in his opinion in Presley v. M/V Caribbean Seal, 
537 F.Supp. 956 (S.D . Texas 1982), partially rev'd. 
1 56Testimony of D.W. Pritchard, member, National Academy 
of Sciences; chairman, Dept. of Oceanography, Johns Hopkins 
University; Director, Chesapeake Bay Institute, Hearings, 
supra . 
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evidence in the record of the hearings that Congress was 
concerned about avoiding inequitable treatment. For 
example, Congressman Lennon, in discussing possible 
reduction in standards for living quarters for seamen under 
the Act stated: 
We can't let discrimination get into this document. We 
must not have that, even among seamen. 157 
While Cong. Lennon was not referring to scientists at the 
time, it does express the sentiment that unfair or unequal 
treatment had no place in the ORVA. 
Considerable discussion took place, and testimony presented, 
concerning adding an amendment to the bill which would have 
made it clear that crew members on RVs would be eligible for 
free medical treatment at public health service hospitals, a 
right of all merchant seamen and even fisherman. This 
amendment failed to carry due to concern that it would meet 
opposition in another committee, purely on a financial 
basis. 158 The record is clear however that the 
Oceanography Subcommittee supported the amendment, and was 
loathe to discriminate at all in the bill. 
Absent any intent to discriminate against scientists with 
respect to seamen's protections afforded by the Jones Act, 
157Hearings, supra @ 56. 
158Id. @ 9 • 
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the question then arises what did Congress intend in Sec. 4. 
The answer can be found in the following statement of Cmdr. 
William Benkert, Assistant Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection 
Division, the senior Coast Guard officer testifying at the 
hearings: 
The elimination of scientific personnel from seaman 
status will remove them from statute applicability 
involving obtainment of merchant mariner documents and 
other related requirements which were not initially 
contemplated for this type of personnel. 159 
A more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 4 of the ORVA, one 
that is consistent with the testimony presented at the 
hearings, is that it was intended only to eliminate the 
statutory requirement that scientists carry merchant 
mariner's documents. 
At the time of the enactment of the ORVA, most commercial 
fishermen were not required to carry merchant mariner's 
documents but did have seaman status for Jones Act 
applicability . 160 Testimony provided at the hearings 
pointed out the similarity between scientists on research 
vessels and commercial fisherman. Dr. Leland Hawthorne, 
Director of the National Science Foundation, testified: 
159Hearings, supra. @ 12. 
16
°For a discussion of remedies available to fishermen, 
see Nixon, supra. 
51 
Fishing vessels are an excellent example; in many 
respects they are similar to oceanographic research 
vessels. They carry complements of fishermen who, like 
the scientists on oceanographic vessels, are engaged in 
the primary mission of their vessels but are not 
necessarily part of the crew. Such vessels have been 
set apart from merchant vessels in the regulations 
regarding manni ng, inspection, and documentation. It 
has become increasingly evident that research vessels 
should also be set apart from the usual vessels that 
ply the sea. 1 6 1 
In similar testimony by John Dermody, Principal 
Oceanographer, Dept of Oceanography, University of 
Washington, scientists on research vessels were compared to: 
... fishermen, whalers , and salvage crews ... who, like 
the scientific crew on a research vessel, are engaged 
in the primary mission of the vessel but are not 
necessarily part of the operating crew. Vessels of 
these three categories have been set apart from 
merchant vessels in the regulations regarding manning, 
inspection, and documentation. 1 62 
Each of these classes of shipboard workers, while receiving 
special consideration for manning, inspection, and 
documentation purposes, still are fully protected by all of 
161Hearings, supra @ 3 7. 
162 Id. @ 26 . 
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the beneficial remedies available to seamen, including the 
Jones Act. 
It can be clearly seen that the intent of those seeking the 
regulatory relief viewed scientists on research vessels as 
similar to fishermen, and deemed regulatory treatment 
similar to fishermen appropriate for scientific personnel. 
As mentioned above, fishermen while exempt from certain 
manning and merchant mariner documentation requirements, had 
all of the remedies available to the traditional seamen. 
Certainly fishermen face the perils of the sea every bit as 
much as any other group of blue-water sailors. 163 In fact 
the work done by scientific personnel on research vessels is 
quite similar to that performed by fisherman. Both are 
often working close to the rail of the vessel (thereby in 
great danger of falling overboard) , deploying and retrieving 
equipment, often heavy and unwieldy, on small, often 
unstable vessels, in all weather. Scientists are exposed to 
the dangers of working near winches and cables in the same 
way fishermen are. 
In his testimony to the Committee, Stanford T. Crapo, 
President, Marine Acoustical Services, Inc., stated: 
... the members of the scientific party aboard are aware 
of the perils of the sea and are prepared to accept 
16 3Nixon, supra@ 372. 
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their exposure to them as a condition of their 
employment, in exactly the same manner as do the 
crewmembers of ships of all types. 164 
It can be seen that supporters of the bill understood the 
dangers faced by scientists, and expected them to be 
considered as similar to crewmembers as opposed to 
passengers. 
In all of the above cited testimony, as well as the entire 
record of the Congressional hearings, it is evident that the 
intent of the interested parties seeking the passage of the 
ORVA was to modify the regulations regarding manning, 
inspection, and documentation. Never was it contemplated 
that scientists on research vessels, exposed to the perils 
of the sea, every much the same as all other blue-water 
sailors, would be denied the special protections afforded 
seamen. It is also clear from the testimony, which 
recognizes scientists as involved in the primary mission of 
the vessel, that except for the current court interpretation 
of Sec. 4, based upon an erroneous reading of the 
legislative history, scientists would be considered seamen 
for Jones Act applicability, and properly afforded such a 
remedy. 
164Hearings, supra @ 28. 
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V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ORVA 
Sennett v. Shell Oil Company 
The first case which forced court interpretation of the ORVA 
came six years after its enactment in Sennett v. Shell Oil 
Company1 65 , still the most cited decision in cases 
involving injured scientists. Albert Sennett was an 
employee of Shell Oil Company, who was killed when "a 
defective seismic air gun misfired and blew off the right 
side of his head. 11166 Sennett's widow and children filed 
suit against Shell under the provisions of the Jones Act, 
DOHSA, General Maritime Law and the Louisiana Civil 
Code. 167 Shell argued that because the worker was hired in 
Louisiana, and because all other remedies were foreclosed by 
the ORVA, the sole remedy available was under the Louisiana 
Workmen's Compensation Law. The court turned to the 
legislative history of the Act to find the answer. Not 
before stating, however, that: 
It would be a strange result if one who labors on the 
high seas may recover against his employer only under 
165325 F. Supp 1 (D. New Orleans 1971). 
166 Id. @ 3. This graphic description of Albert Sennett's 
death taken from Judge Rubin's decision clearly underscores 
the hazards to which scientific personnel on research vessels 
are exposed. 
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state compensation laws for an industrial accident. 168 
In the legislative history the court found that the law: 
... does not, with respect to either their traditional 
maritime crew or their scientific personnel, change the 
provisions of general maritime law. It does not 
provide any compensation scheme with respect to 
industrial accidents to scientific personnel although 
Congress clearly had the power to do so. And it 
neither says nor implies that scientific personnel 
shall have the protection of the statutes of each of 
the fifty states depending upon where each made his 
contract of employment. 169 
The court also found that: 
The O.R.V. Law does not in terms remove scientific 
personnel from seaman's status under either the general 
maritime law or the Jones Act. It provides merely that 
they are not considered seamen under Title 53 of the 
Revised Statutes "and Act (sic) amendatory thereof or 
supplementary thereto. 11 170 
Judge Rubin did not find plaintiff's arguments persuasive 
that "because the Jones Act is neither a part of Title 53 
16s id. 
169 Id. @ 4. 
17o id. @ 6. 
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nor expressly mentioned in the O.R.V . Law it should remain 
fully applicable to 0. R. V. 's. " 171 He held that the Act 
excluded Sennet's survivors from maintaining an action under 
the statutory provisions of the Jones Act or DOSHA . The 
opinion upheld Sennet's seaman status under the general 
maritime law however, and citing Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines1 72 found Sennet's survivors had a right to sue for 
wrongful death under the general maritime law. 
The Sennet decision therefore established the precedent that 
the ORVA excludes scientific personnel aboard ORVs from 
bringing suit under the statutory protections afforded 
"seamen" in the Jones Act, while maintaining their right to 
"seaman status" and remedies available under the general 
maritime law. 
Castro v. Vessel Lafeyette173 
In 1978, seven years after the Sennett decision, the Houston 
Division of the Southern District Court of Texas, heard the 
case of Basilio T. Castro, who brought suit against the 
v essel, and his employers (neither the vessel's owners or 
operators) for injuries sustained aboard the RV LAFAYETTE, 
1 72 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Overruled The Harrisburg, 119 
U.S. 199 (1886). 
1 73Civil Action No. 76 -H755 (S.D. Texas, Houston 
Division, Slip Opinion, March 2, 1 978) 
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during the course of his employment. The court found the 
ORVA applicable, as the LAFAYETTE was a research vessel, and 
Castro was "scientific personnel" under the meaning of the 
Act. In a slip opinion, the court affirmed summary 
judgement for the defendant employers. The court cited 
Sennett in finding that plaintiff was barred from a Jones 
Act remedy, but went even further, holding that the ORVA 
precluded Castro from asserting seaman status under the 
general maritime law as well. 
Delahoussey v. Western Geophysical 174 
In the year following the Castro decision, another District 
Court considered a case brought by an injured scientist. 
Leo Delahousey filed an action against Western Geophysical, 
his employer for over eleven years, and the owner of the six 
vessels plaintiff had worked on during that period. 
Delahoussey claimed he had suffered noise-induced hearing 
loss due to excessive noise at his workplace aboard the 
vessels which thereby constituted an unseaworthy condition. 
No Jones Act action was filed, only an action for 
unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. The court 
cited both Robison and Sennett in upholding Delahousey's 
status as a seamen while awarding damages for the injuries 
174Delahoussey v. Western Geophysical Company and the M/V 
WESTERN CREST, WESTERN REEF, WESTERN GULF, WESTERN BEACON, 
WESTERN CAY, and WESTERN GEOPHYSICAL II, 476 F. Supp. 54, 
Civil Action No. S76 -365 (N), (S.D. Miss., June 29, 1979). 
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sustained due to defendant's failure to provide a seaworthy 
vessel upon which plaintiff could perform his duties. 
Presley v. Caribbean Seal 175 
In 1982, yet another district court, the fourth to do so, 
had the opportunity to comment on Congressional intent in 
enacting the ORVA. James Presley was a compressor mechanic 
who, during the course of his employment aboard the RV 
Caribbean Seal, was injured when his arm became entangled in 
a piece of operating machinery. He brought suit for 
negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under 
the general maritime law. Judge Gibson of the U.S. District 
Court of Southern Texas, Galveston Division, took a 
different reading on the legislative history of the ORVA 
than judges in the districts previously to have considered 
the issue. He determined that Congress had not "envisioned 
the exclusion of scientific personnel from consideration as 
seamen for purposes of the Jones Act and the general 
maritime law. " 17 6 
Judge Gibson found "an inherent tension in the Sennett 
opinion" 177 with its (Sennett's) finding that scientific 
175 709 F.2d 406 (Fifth Circuit, 1983) cert denied; 537 F. 
Supp. 956 (1982) Civil Action No. G-81-56 (S.D. Texas, 
Galveston Division, April 26, 1982). 
176 5 3 7 F. Supp. 9 5 6, 9 6 0 ( S. D. Texas 19 8 2) . 
177 Id. @ 961 
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personnel, could be considered seamen under the general 
maritime law while at the same time non-seamen under the 
statutory provisions of the Jones Act. Gibson on the other 
hand, after a detailed review of the ORVA legislative 
history, found that "a narrower construction of the statute 
[was] required. "178 
He noted that 
The Research Vessel Operators Council, which logically 
would seem to have been the group most concerned with 
liability under the Jones Act and general maritime law, 
expressed dissatisfaction only with licensing and 
manning provisions. 179 
Judge Gibson denied summary judgement for the defendant, 
holding that the ORVA does not preclude scientific personnel 
from maintaining an action under either the Jones Act or the 
general maritime law. He wrote: 
Nor does the legislative history of the ORVA, on 
balance, support the defendant's contention that 
scientific personnel may not retain seamen status under 
the Jones Act and general maritime law. Congress 
adopted the ORVA in 1965 to exempt research vessels 
from the strict inspection and personnel protection 
laws mandated for commercial vessels. The legislative 
178 Id. @ 960. 
179Id. 
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history, and particularly the hearings before the House 
Subcommittee, clearly show that Congress excluded 
scientific personnel from consideration as seamen under 
Title 53 to avoid the operation of regulations that 
were ill-suited to such personnel and unnecessarily 
hindered them in their performance of their technical 
or scientific functions. There is no indication, 
however, that Congress believed the Jones Act standard 
of care or the general obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel to be so onerous when applied to 
scientific personnel as to require the exclusion of 
these persons from the range of the laws humanitarian 
policy. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. This is 
amplified by absence of a congressional provision of a 
compensation scheme to scientific personnel, and the 
failure of the Act to state or imply that scientific 
personnel would have the protection of the statutes of 
each of the 50 states depending on the happenstance of 
where each made his contract of employment. See Sennett 
v. Shell Oil 
In sum, the Court finds that Congress in enacting 
the ORVA did not intend that scientific personnel, any 
more than traditional blue water sailors, should be 
left without a remedy if injured, or that their 
dependents were to be helpless if the injury resulted 
in death. See Warner v. Goltra. The Court holds that 
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scientific personnel on board oceanographic research 
vessels, if otherwise entitled to assert seaman status 
under the Jones Act and general maritime law, are not 
prevented from doing so by the ORVA, but are entitled 
to the same remedies available to "all those whose 
duties contribute to the operation and welfare of the 
vessel." Offshore v. Robison 180 
The defendants appealed the district court's decision, and 
the Fifth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to hear 
an ORVA case concerning remedies available to an injured 
scientist. 181 The Fifth Circuit upheld the District 
Court's finding with respect to the general maritime law but 
reversed that part of the opinion related to the Jones Act. 
The Appeals Court: 
[was] persuaded by Judge Rubin's analysis in Sennett v. 
Shell Oil, that the Jones Act either amends or 
supplements title 53. 182 
Craig v. M/V Peacock183 
180 Id. @ 964, some citations omitted. 
181The Ninth Circuit, held in 1981 in the case of United 
States v. Blue Water Marine Industries, 661 F.2d 793, that 
ORVs are subject to merchant-vessel manning statutes. No 
scientist injury question was involved. 
182 709 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 1983). 
183Craig v. M/V Peacock, 760 F.2d 953 (Ninth Circuit 
1985). 
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In the year following the Presley decision, the Ninth 
Circuit heard the case of Larry Lewis, a scientist who died 
when he fell overboard from the research vessel Peacock 
during the course of his employment. Dianne Craig, Lewis' 
wife, filed suit for wrongful death. At the trial the 
parties assumed applicability of the ORVA. 184 As was the 
Fifth in Presley, the Ninth Circuit was "persuaded by Judge 
Rubin's analysis in Sennett. "185 The Craig opinion also 
cites the Fifth Circuit's Presley decision, but goes much 
farther than Presley, relying on its own earlier decision in 
the Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services, Inc. 1 86 in 
holding that scientific personnel are not seamen and 
therefore not entitled to benefit from the doctrine of 
seaworthiness. The ruling thereby exonerated the shipowners 
in the death of Larry Lewis. 
Judge Wisdom, Senior Circuit Judge from the Fifth Circuit 
(the author of the Robison decision) , sitting by 
designation, issued a lengthy dissent, which begins: 
The majority in this case does a serious injustice to 
scientific personnel serving on oceanographic research 
1 84 Id. @ 955 . 
1 85 Id. @ 956. 
186 709 F. 2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983) . A case similar to the 
Seventh Circuit's Johnson v. John F. Beasely. One requirement 
for a determination of seaman's status is that "the claimant 
must be aboard primarily in the aid of navigation." 
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vessels. Seamen-scientists serving as members of an 
ORV crew may, at times be exposed to greater perils of 
the sea than are traditional seamen. 187 
And adds later: 
I would hold that as a _matter of law a member of the 
scientific crew of a research vessel is a seaman. 
Lewis's widow may have no claim under the Jones Act, 
because of a literal reading of ORVA, but she has a 
claim under the general maritime law . 188 
Judge Wisdom, therefore would hold Presley over the majority 
decision in Craig. His reference to "may have no claim 
under the Jones Act, because of a literal reading of the 
ORVA" (emphasis added) seems to imply that he is not 
completely supportive of that literal reading, and perhaps 
would also agree with Judge Gibson's District Court opinion 
in Presley. 
Smith v. Odum Offshore Surveys, Inc. 189 
Roger Smith was a hydrographic party chief, normally 
assigned to a survey vessel, who was killed while working 
temporarily ashore. The trial court found that Smith was a 
187 Id. @ 957. 
188 Id. @ 961. 
189 791 F.2d 411 (5th Circuit 1986); 588 F. Supp. 1168 
(M.D. Louisiana 1984) 
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seaman under the Robison criteria. Defendant's argument 
that the ORVA precluded Smith's Jones Act claim was denied 
because the vessel had not applied for, nor been designated 
by the U.S. Coast Guard as an Ocean Research Vessel, as 
required under the ORV Law. The finding was affirmed by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Mitola v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory, et al 190 
Dan Mitola, a twenty year employee of defendant Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL) was 
assigned to the R/V AMY CHOEST as the Supervisor of Marine 
Operations. His responsibilities included deployment and 
recovery of towed equipment used in oceanographic research. 
Mitola was knocked down and injured by a large wave, while 
working on the vessel's back deck. Mitola brought an action 
against his employer, JHU/APL and the vessel's owner Alpha 
Marine Services for negligence under the Jones Act, and for 
unseaworthiness of the vessel and for maintenance and cure. 
Defendants filed for summary judgement which was granted on 
all counts. The court, citing Craig, Presley, and Bennet, 
held that: 
Even assuming Mitola was a "seaman" under general 
maritime law principles, his Jones Act claim is barred 
19 0 839 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. Maryland 1993). 
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by the Oceanographic Research Vessel Act. 1 9 1 
The court found that "the evidence undisputedly establishes 
that Mitola was a member of the scientific research team, 
not the vessels crew," thereby finding Mitola excluded from 
a Jones Act claim as a matter of law. The court was not 
persuaded by Mitola's claim that he was a seaman in 
"functional capacity" because his job entailed on-deck 
rigging, which involved the operation of cranes and winches, 
as well as the handling of lines, cables and shackles, 
holding that " the mere performance of such manual duties 
fails to transform Mitola into a seaman. 1119 2 
Again citing Craig, Presley, and Sennett, the court stated 
that: 
Although classification as scientific personnel under 
ORVA precludes an individual from being considered a 
seaman for purposes of the Jones Act, it does not 
prevent that individual from being a "seaman" under 
general maritime law for other purposes . 193 
However, the court also upheld summary judgement for the 
defendants on the unseaworthiness claim finding that Mitola 
had not offered any evidence that the vessel was 
unseaworthy, but merely alleged that the Master's decision 
191 Id. @ 354. 
1 92 Id. @ 356. 
193 Id. @ 357 
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to drive the vessel through a hurricane as "imprudent." 
The court found that: 
Even assuming the truth of this allegation, a single 
negligent act committed by an otherwise competent crew 
member cannot render a ship unseaworthy. This well-
established principle derives from the basic 
distinction between liability based upon seaworthiness 
and that based upon negligence. 1 94 
In Mitola, therefore, we have a 1993 seaman-scientist's 
equivalent to Chelentis1 95 , the landmark 1918 Supreme Court 
decision which ultimately led Congress to enact the Jones 
Act. Chelentis, too, was injured by a wave in rough 
weather, and similar to the facts in Mitola, because the 
vessel was not deemed unseaworthy, he was denied any remedy 
beyond maintenance and cure even though his leg was 
eventually amputated. 
Chandler v. Alpha Marine Services196 
This is a consolidated case initiated by the survivors of 
two workers aboard the R/V AMY CHOEST who were killed when 
an explosive charge accidentally detonated on deck. The 
1 94 Id. @ 3 5 8. Citing Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. , 
400 U.S. 494 (1971). 
1 95 247 U.S. 372 (1918) 
196Patsy L. Chandler et al v. Alpha Marine Services et al 
1994 U.S . Dist LEXIS 5148 (E.D. Louisiana 1994) . 
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defendants filed for summary judgement on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs were barred by the ORVA from proclaiming 
seaman status. The court granted summary judgement to 
defendants only on the Jones Act claim. The court cited the 
Fifth Circuit's Presley decision while holding: 
... scientific personnel aboard research vessels can 
still maintain an action as seamen against the vessel 
under general maritime law for unseaworthiness and a 
negligence action under general maritime law against 
parties who were not their employers. 197 
The court found that the two decedents, "Sinclair and Burks 
were constantly exposed to the perils of the sea. 111 98 They 
"slept and ate on the vessel and were therefore exposed to 
the hazards of the sea 24 hours a day for the entire 
voyage. 111 99 "Sinclair and Burks exposure to marine perils 
was "substantial in point and time and not merely 
spasmodic. 11200 
197Id. @ 9. 
19sid @ 7. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. @ 8. 
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Workmen's compensation cases 
Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Education2 0 1 
Benders was the chief steward aboard the RV ENDEAVOR, a U.S. 
Coast Guard designated research vessel, operated by the 
University of Rhode Island. He was injured in 1985, while 
the vessel was operating off the coast of Brazil. In 1986, 
Benders entered into a memorandum of agreement with the 
State of Rhode Island that was filed with the Workers' 
Compensation Court, and he began receiving benefits from the 
Rhode Island Employee's Compensation Fund for medical 
expenses and lost wages. 202 Benders subsequently initiated 
a Jones Act suit in Federal District Court . He was awarded 
$200,000. The Compensation fund sued for the return of the 
$132,000 it had already paid for the injury. The District 
Court denied this motion because it had already considered 
this amount in establishing the steward's Jones Act award. 
Bender sued the Fund in state court to continue payments. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court 
ruling that no further payments were owed plaintiff. 
Although this case involved a steward who was not barred by 
the ORVA from a Jones Act action, and perhaps only 
coincidentally took place on a research vessel, the Court's 
2 0 1 636 A.2d 1313 (R.I. 1994 ) 
202 Id . @ 1314. 
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opinion is illustrative of the problems that can arise when 
a blue water worker seeks remedy within a state compensation 
system. The Bender Court recognized that the Jones Ac t 
provides for recovery for pain and suffering and derivative 
claims such as loss of consortium, neither of which are 
compensable under R.I. workers' compensation law203 , making 
clear that a seaman limited to a workers's compensation 
scheme would be at a disadvantage with respect to potential 
award. The Court went on to say: 
The interrelation of federal and state law as it 
applies to maritime workers is often complex . 
Traditionally the law of the sea is federal in nature 
and falls under the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts . 204 
The Court refers to its own earlier recognition of the 
Jensen rule where an injured maritime worker was found to be 
limited to his federal remedy. 205 Also cited in the Bender 
decision is the United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Lindgren v. United States2 0 6 in which the Court concluded: 
"that the Jones Act operates uniformly within all of the 
States ... and that, as it covers the entire field of 
203 Id. ® 1315. 
204 Id . ® 1316. 
205 Id. @ 1316, citing Duffy v. Providence Teaming Co . , 49 
R. I. 476 (1929) 
206 281 U.S. 38 (1930). 
70 
liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and 
exclusive, and supersedes the operation of all state 
statutes dealing with that subject." 
The Rhode Island Court recognizes that in certain 
circumstances the courts have modified the Jensen and 
Lindgren rules, in order to avoid "the harsh result of 
uncovered or undercovered workers", but that these 
modifications are normally acceptable only when a maritime 
matter such as an injury to a seaman is deemed to be of 
"purely local concern. "207 The Court held that "Benders 
was not engaged in essentially 'local' activities when he 
was injured" and therefore"· .. this is not a case wherein 
the injured worker falls within a so-called twilight zone 
between federal and state recovery and would have no remedy 
for his injury. "208 
However, had Bender been a member of the scientific party on 
that same vessel, the R.I. Supreme Court might very well 
have been dealing with an injured worker who was within a 
"twilight zone" of coverage. 209 
207Bender v. Board of Governors for Higher Education, 
supra@ 1317. 
209See Discussion, Section VI infra. 
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Decourt v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 210 
William A. Decourt was a technician employed by respondent 
Beckman Instruments, Inc. with responsibility to perform 
tests on developmental diving equipment from the decks of 
the research vessel EL TORITO and the EL TORITO's skiff. 211 
Decourt was drowned during the course of his employment. 
The California Appellate Court reversed the trial court's 
finding that the California Industrial Accident Commission 
had jurisdiction over the accident. The Appeals Court 
relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in London 
Co. v. Industrial Corrunission212 and the California Supreme 
Court's decision in Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Corrunission213 , while finding that the state 
compensation court was not competent to make an award for 
damages in a maritime case. 
In London Co. the Supreme Court held that: 
A seaman's injury or death on navigable waters can 
never be a local matter within local jurisdiction. 
2 1 0 32 Cal. App. 3d 628, (C.A.Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 1 
1973) . 
211The court records do not indicate if the EL TORITO was 
designated by the U.S. Coast Guard as an ORV. Applicability 
of the ORVA did not surface in the case, and Decourt was 
deemed to be a Jones Act seaman. 
212 279 U.S. 109 (1930); An appeal of a California case. 
213 24 Cal. 2d 310 ( 1944) . 
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and 
Application of a state workmen's compensation act to a 
claim ... having no features other than those 
characteristically maritime, is a violation of the 
exclusive maritime jurisdiction. 
The state compensation act cannot be made applicable to 
an accident in which the employee was a 
seaman . .. without affecting or impinging upon the 
admiralty jurisdiction to an extent heretofore never 
permitted by this Court. 2~ 
In Occidental Indemnity, the California Supreme Court 
reversed and nullified an award by the Industrial Accident 
Commission for lack of jurisdiction, even after the 
Commission specifically found that the claimant was not a 
seaman. In the Decourt case, the majority held: 
The rights and duties involved in the Jones Act remedy 
differ from those under the state compensation act both 
in the i r source under the Constitution of the United 
States and in their nature as developed by the federal 
cases. The issues determinative of jurisdiction under 
the Jones Act are thus far different from those 
determinative of jurisdiction under the state 
compensation law. 215 
214 279 U.S. 109,122. 
215 32 Cal. App . 3d 628, 635. 
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It can thus be seen that circumstances could arise in which 
a scientist could be barred from a Jones Act suit by the 
ORVA, and yet still be beyond the jurisdiction of the state 
workers' compensation system of one or more of the 50 
States . 
VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The thesis of this paper is that a scientist injured on a 
research vessel is at a serious disadvantage with respect to 
available remedies when compared to all other "seamen" --
even a co-worker, on the same vessel, perhaps injured in the 
same accident, if the co-worker is classified as a "non-
scientist," or more "traditional" crewmember. This inequity 
arises as a result of the ambiguous wording of Section 4 of 
the Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965, and subsequent 
literal interpretation by several courts, which found that 
Congress intended to specifically deny scientists the 
statutory remedy afforded all other seamen under the Jones 
Act. The above sections have attempted to show that: (1) 
The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress 
never intended such a result; and (2) Exclusion of 
scientists, who face the perils of the sea to the same 
degree as all other blue water seamen, is directly in 
conflict with trends of both Congress and the Courts with 
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respect to providing beneficial remedies for workers who 
face such hazards. 
The paper has outlined two basic policy considerations with 
respect to remedies afforded injured maritime workers: 
(1) The beneficial remedies for seamen are extended to all 
those who regularly face the hazards of the sea in the 
course of their employment; and (2) Alternative remedies are 
afforded all others, such as longshoremen and maritime 
workers. It is clear that both the Courts216 and 
Congress217 recognize that scientists on research vessels 
are, in the course of their employment, exposed to the same 
hazards as "traditional" seamen. Scientists have not been 
granted any alternative remedy for injury, in compensation 
for the remedies denied them by court interpretation of the 
ORVA, "although Congress clearly had the power to do 
so. " 218 It is illogical that the Fifth Circuit, the same 
court which handed down the Robison decision, extending 
"seaman's status", could also have held in Presley, that an 
injured scientist was barred from "seaman status" for Jones 
Act applicability. That same Court also held in Wallace v. 
Oceaneering International that: 
[I]n ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has 
216See supra Section V. 
217See supra Section IV. 
218See supra p. [30], Sennett v. Shell Oil Co. 
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focused on (1) the degree of exposure to the hazards or 
perils of the sea, and (2) the maritime or terra firma 
nature of the workers duties. 
[and] 
[T]he seaman status of Wallace is established by his 
exposure to maritime perils with regularity and 
continuity, and the maritime nature of his primary 
duti~s. 219 
There can be no doubt, that except for interpretation of 
Section 4 of the ORVA, scientific personnel on research 
vessels would be afforded by the courts all of the remedies 
available to seamen, if they otherwise qualify for such 
status under the new two prong test established this year in 
Chandris v. Latsis. 220 
The only policy justification which can be imagined 
supporting exclusion of oceanographic personal from the 
beneficial remedies of the Jones Act would be to limit their 
employer's liability. However, as Judge Gibson pointed out 
in his Presley decision, there is no reference to such a 
goal in the legislative history. 221 Additionally, in his 
concurring opinion in Chandris v. Latsis, Justice Stevens 
unequivocally points out that the Jones Act was enacted to 
219 727 F.2d@ 434. 
22 0 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047 
221See supra note 1 79. 
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protect workers exposed to the perils of the sea, not "as a 
scheme to protect employers . " 222 
The Fifth Circuit, in its Presley decision, relied too 
heavily on the literal interpretation of the Sennett Court . 
They should have let Judge Gibson's holding in Presley 
stand. 223 His was a more thorough analysis of the ORVA 
legislative history than that in Sennett. Gibson correctly 
determined that Congress did not intend to deny scientists 
the beneficial remedy of the Jones Act, and in the opinion 
of this author, was the only court to correctly interpret 
the ORVA . Judge Wisdom's dissent in Craig22 4 also appears 
to indicate his dissatisfaction with the literal 
interpretation of the Sennett analysis. 
The hazards faced by scientists on research vessels does not 
seem to be in question. The accidental deaths of Albert 
Sennett, Larry Lewis (Craig v. M/V PEACOCK), and Lee Roy 
Burks and Burney Sinclair (Chandler v. Alpha Marine 
Services) underscore this fact. It is therefore contrary to 
the general policy which provides beneficial remedies to 
injured seamen, to deny an individual class of blue-water 
seamen some (potentially all) of those remedies. Although 
222 1995 U.S. LEXIS @ *70, J.Stevens concurring. 
223 See supra p. [33). 
22 4 See supra p. [3 5] . 
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injured scientists have in some jurisdictions been able to 
maintain actions under the general maritime law, other 
courts have denied this avenue of relief as well, 225 
thereby reopening a "twilight zone" where an injured 
maritime worker is forced to straddle the remedies available 
under the federal maritime law and state workers' 
compensation systems. 
Clearly this is a huge step into the past. In 1942, the 
Supreme Court recognized the concept of a "twilight zone" 
with respect to coverage for injured land based maritime 
workers covered under the LHWCA. 226 
In determining whether state law or the LHWCA applied 
to the injuries to land-based maritime workers, the 
Court recognized that no clear line existed to 
determine which compensation regime ruled but rather 
that a twilight zone existed wherein a case-by-case 
determination needed to be made about whether the state 
or the federal remedy would compensate a worker. 227 
The Court later recognized the amendments to the LHWCA and 
225See supra Section V: Castro v. Vessel LAFAYETTE, Civil 
Action No. 76-H755 (S.D. Texas, Houston Division, Slip 
Opinion, March 2, 1978); Craig v. M/V PEACOCK, 760 F.2d 953 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
226Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 49 
(1942). 
227Benders v. Board of Education, 636 A.2d 1313,1317 (R.I. 
19 94) , citing Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of 
Washington, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). 
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for the most part the "twilight zone" has been closed. 
However, "neither Congress nor the Court has ever abrogated 
Jensen as it relates to seamen covered under the Jones 
Act. 1122 0 
It is possible, even likely, that a new and more dangerous 
"twilight zone" has been created with rulings barring 
scientists from Jones Act coverage. Take, for example, the 
case of Mi tola v . JHU/APL22 9 • Dan Mitola was injured on a 
vessel found to be seaworthy, but was denied a Jones Act 
suit under Section 4 of ORVA . Mitola's only other remedy 
would therefore seem to lie within a state workers' 
compensation scheme. But , had Mitola's employment contract 
been based in California, he might have been denied an award 
by the Industrial Accident Commission under the decision in 
Occidental Indemnity Co., which held that the state 
compensation court is not competent to make an award for 
damages in a maritime case. 230 The Mi tola case is clearly 
maritime. Even though he was denied a Jones Act suit as a 
matter of law, he was still entitled to an unseaworthiness 
action. But, as in this case, if the vessel is found to be 
seaworthy, would Mitola then be able to receive benefits 
payable under a state compensation system? Would the answer 
228 Id. @ 1317. 
229 839 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. Maryland 1993 ) . 
230See supra p. [40], 24 Cal. 2d 310 (1944) 
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be the same in all of the fifty States? 
The record does not indicate precisely how much of his 
working time Mitola spent aboard ship, therefore it is not 
possible to speculate whether he would have satisfied the 
"approximately 30 percent" of work time requirement laid out 
in the 1995 Chandris decision. There is no doubt however 
that there are oceanographic personnel, both scientists and 
technicians, who do meet the Chandris test. Any of these 
workers could have an accident with circumstances similar to 
Mitola, and potentially be denied all of the beneficial 
remedies intended to protect maritime workers who regularly 
are exposed to the perils of the sea. 
The Sennett Court itself stated : 
It would be a strange result if one who labors on the 
high seas may recover against his employer only under 
state compensation laws for an industrial accident. 231 
But this is exactly the result, in cases such as Mitola's 
where seaman status under the general maritime law is 
maintained, but the vessel is determined to be seaworthy, 
and also in cases in circuits such as the Ninth, where 
Section 4 of the ORVA is held to preclude all seaman's 
actions, including those under the general maritime law . 
23 1 3 2 5 F. Supp. 1, 3 . 
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This brings rise the question of consistency and uniformity 
of the federal maritime law. The Sennett Court was very 
concerned with the uniformity of the maritime law . In spite 
of the fact that the Court's interpretation of the ORVA 
resulted in denial of a scientist's seaman status under the 
Jones Act, in support of its holding that the ORVA did 
nothing to alter a scientist's right to seaman status under 
the general maritime law, the Court quoted a lengthy passage 
from the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines. 232 Moragne, decided only the year before 
Sennett, overruled the Harrisburg while finding a wrongful 
death action within the general maritime law. The Supreme 
Court stated: 
The existence of a maritime remedy for deaths of seamen 
in territorial waters will further, rather than hinder, 
"uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction"; 
and 
The Court's ruling in Gillespie233 was only that the 
Jones Act, which was intended to bring about the 
uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction 
required by the Constitution * * * necessarily 
supersedes the application of the death statutes of the 
232 398 U.S. 375 (1970) 
233 Ci ting Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. , 3 79 U.S. 
148 (1964). 
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several States. 234 
It is therefore extremely unfortunate that the Sennet Court, 
so concerned with the uniformity of the federal maritime 
law, through a literal interpretation of the ORVA and a 
faulty review of the legislative history, set the precedent 
by which that uniformity has been seriously compromised. 
Uniformity is currently compromised in several ways. 
Scientists have seamen's rights under the maritime law in 
some circuits but are denied them in others. Additionally, 
injured scientists are likely to be forced into one of fifty 
separate and different state workers' compensation systems -
- seeking relief under laws that never contemplated maritime 
injuries. The nation's policy of maintaining a uniform 
maritime law, as well as equitable considerations for 
injured scientists, speak strongly for a reevaluation of the 
current state of the law, with regard to interpretation and 
application of the ORVA . 
In addition to the Jones Act remedies and those contained 
within the maritime law which may be unavailable to an 
injured scientist, he also is denied access to a jury 
trial, which is provided for in the Jones Act, but not 
234Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F . Supp. 1, 7; citing 
Moragne v . States Marine Lines . 
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otherwise guaranteed in Admiralty by the Federal maritime 
law . Again, no policy justification has been made for this 
exclusion. The determination of "seaman status'' is a mixed 
question of law and fact. There is no reason why scientists 
should be denied a jury hearing their "seaman status" claim 
as a matter of law under the ORVA decisions. In Chandris v. 
Latsis the Supreme Court held that: 
The jury should be permitted, when determining whether 
a maritime employee has the requisite employment-
related connection to a vessel in navigation to qualify 
as a member of the vessel's crew , to consider all 
relevant circumstances ... ". ~5 
An injured scientist should have this right as do all other 
blue-water sailors . 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has described the inequitable situation which 
exists with respect to remedies available to scientists 
injured aboard research vessels. This inequity is 
attributed to faulty Court analysis of the legislative 
history of the Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965. The paper 
does not argue that Congress could not have denied 
scientists seaman status under the Jones Act. It clearly 
2351995 U.S. LEXIS 4047, *42. 
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had the power to do so. In upholding the constitutionality 
of the Jones Act, the Supreme Court held that Congress is 
empowered to add to the maritime law. 236 Certainly if 
Congress was able to enact the Jones Act it was authorized 
to limit its applicability. This paper has presented 
evidence which indicates that Congress, in enacting the 
ORVA, never contemplated such a result. The Supreme Court 
has also held that the desire for uniformity is insufficient 
to override federal statute. 237 However, this paper has 
argued that uniformity of the maritime law has been 
compromised, but not out of Congressional intent. The 
thesis of this paper is that regular exposure to the "perils 
of the sea 11 is the foundation of Jones Act coverage238 , and 
therefore scientists should be afforded that coverage as are 
all other seamen. 
As discussed in the preface, this paper was substantially 
complete before the Supreme Court's ruling earlier this year 
in Chandris v. La ts is. 23 9 The Chandris rule which now 
requires that an employee spend 30 percent, more or less, of 
his working time at sea in order to be classified as a ship-
236 Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) . 
237Sims supra @ 1008, citing Mobil Oil v. Higgenbotham, 
436 U.S . 618 (1978). 
238Robertson supra @ 96, citing Mungia v. Chevron Co. 675 
F . 2d 630 (5th Circuit 1982) (quoting Robison, 266 F.2d @ 771). 
2 3 919 9 5 U . S . LEX IS 4 0 4 7 
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based (as opposed to land based) maritime worker entitled to 
"seaman status" would likely disqualify many scientific 
personnel from such a determination. However, this new 
temporal test for seaman status only makes the existing 
inequity even greater for those oceanographic personnel who 
would otherwise qualify for "seaman status", but will be 
denied this valued status according to interpretation of 
Section 4 of the ORVA. An interpretation which has been 
shown to be misplaced. 
The paper has pointed out that no policy justification can 
be shown for the interpretation of section 4 which denies 
scientific personnel the beneficial remedies of the Jones 
Act and the general maritime law despite their regular 
exposure to the perils of the sea which would otherwise 
qualify them for seaman status. In light of the Supreme 
Court's "seaman status" test outlined in its Wilander/ 
Chandris decisions, it is now even more imperative that the 
inequity be addressed, for the benefit of the injured 
scientists who may be denied appropriate remedies, and for 
the purpose of maintaining the consistency of the federal 
maritime law. 
Some commentators have argued that the Jones Act itself may 
be unnecessary today, and that a workmen's compensation type 
85 
approach would be more useful. 240 That question is beyond 
the scope of this paper, which is concerned with the 
inequity of denying beneficial remedies to only one small 
class of blue-water workers. However, studies do indicate 
that seafaring remains substantially more dangerous than 
most shorebased occupations. 241 
The present inequity may be rectified by either the Congress 
or the Supreme Court. The Court might accept certiorari of 
an ORVA case in order to end the inconsistency which 
currently exists in the lower courts. However, having so 
recently created its two prong seaman status test with the 
Wilander/ Chandris decisions, it is unlikely that the Court 
will chose to review another "seaman status" case in the 
near future. Particularly one with such a narrow focus, 
pertaining only to scientist seamen. 
Congress could also seek to remedy the inequity caused by 
the misinterpretation of its 1965 Act. This author believes 
that Congressional action, amending the ORVA, is not only 
the more likely solution, but the preferred one as well. A 
240See Schoenbaum supra @ 181 and Nixon, Recent 
developments in U.S. commercial Fishing vessel safety, 
insurance and law. 17 J.Mar. Com. Law No . 3:359, July, 1986. 
241Barss, Monaghan, and Hall, A review of injuries and 
illnesses aboard research vessels of the Universitv National 
Oceanographic System. Unpublished study funded by the National 
Science Foundation, August, 1988. 
86 
rewording could clarify that Section 4's original reference 
to Title 53 of the Revised Statutes referred only to manning 
regulations and requirements for merchant seaman's 
documents, and that scientists, because of the hazards they 
face, are to be considered "seamen" entitled to all 
beneficial remedies afforded other seamen exposed to the 
"perils of the sea." Congress can, and should, address this 
issue to right the serious injustice which has been done to 
scientific personnel who serve on oceanographic research 
vessels. 242 
242 Paraphrasing Judge Wisdom's dissent in Craig v . M/V 
Peacock 760 F.2d @ 957 (1985). 
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